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SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) INTELLIGENCE IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD
Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. iii in the protection of the American people. However, current policy and practice limits the employment of MI in that web. The changes to government policy and law on the use of domestic and foreign intelligence since 9/11 increase the potential for the proper use of MI capabilities in support of domestic security. However, to date, the changes that have been put in effect do not directly enable MI to provide that support.
Following a brief description of two key national strategies affecting terrorism and homeland security, each of which place value in the contributions intelligence can provide, this paper will analyze the conditions pertaining to intelligence sharing and law enforcement leading to the events of 9/11 and the federal government's responses to improve such intelligence sharing. It will conclude with a summary of key actions necessary for MI to properly integrate into the United States' 'seamless web of defense.'
STRATEGIC CONCEPTS
The United States elevated the defeat of global terrorism as a key concept in the attainment of its goals as outlined in its National Security Strategy. iv To that end, the Bush Administration developed several supporting strategies which heretofore had not enjoyed the status of 'national strategies.' Two key documents in this hierarchy of strategies are the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism , focusing "on identifying and detecting threats before they reach our borders," v and the National Strategy for Homeland Security, which "focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the United States." vi Together, these strategies establish a framework with which to array the ends, ways, and means necessary to protect the United States from the effects of global terrorism.
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism identifies the attainment of four goals as essential for success:
• "defeat terrorists and their organizations;"
• "deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists;"
• "diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit;" and,
• "defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad." vii This defeat, deny, diminish, defend strategy envisions the employment of all instruments of national power -"diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military" in achieving these goals.
viii Although no one goal has primacy on any other, U.S. strategy establishes the priorities of defeating and defending. "Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the terrorists' ability to plan and operate." ix Further, "we will defend the United States, our citizens, and our interests at home and abroad…" x Key resources for executing these priorities include the Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies, xi as well as the military.
xii What will become critical to success as the nation mobilizes to fight the war on terror is the level of integration of these key resources. As will be addressed later, there have been and continue to be in place some policies designed to protect individual liberties which, in effect, limit true integration. While the policies serve to provide checks and balances on our law enforcement activities, they have been perceived to create significant barriers to effective execution of the counterterrorism effort.
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
Within a month of 9/11, President Bush created the Office of Homeland Security within the White House. He then directed it to create the first ever Strategy for Homeland Security xiii in order to coordinate the critical principles, ideas, efforts, and resources toward protecting the homeland. The strategy identified three objectives:
• "prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
• reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism; and
• minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur." xiv It further identifies six critical mission areas:
• "intelligence and warning;
• border and transportation security;
• domestic counterterrorism;
• protecting critical infrastructure and key assets;
• defending against catastrophic terrorism; and
• emergency preparedness and response."
Of these six areas, the first three are oriented primarily to preventing terrorist attacks. The basic idea of the law is to separate criminal activity from the activities of foreign governments.
Therefore, the conventional notion of probable cause, as in a criminal case, is not wholly applicable in a foreign intelligence case. In all cases, intelligence collection against United States persons, including "electronic surveillance, unconsented physical search, mail surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring devices," xxxi "for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes," must be approved by the Attorney General, based upon his/her determination of probable cause that the collection is conducted against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
xxxvii Two basic concepts germane to the issue of intelligence collection arise from analysis of the 4 th Amendment. First, the amendment is designed to protect the law abiding citizen, not the criminal. After establishment of probable cause, the target of the collection (search) is subject to any search which can give evidence. Where probable cause is not established, those U.S. persons are shielded from search. xxxviii The second concept is the existence of a system of checks and balances in the process of allowing the search. Even the most well-intentioned investigator can be subject to the passion of the search for evidence, such that he loses objectivity in establishing the existence of probable cause. For this reason, the judiciary possesses the authority to issue warrants and appropriately scope the search before it occurs.
xxxix The processes internal to the requirements laid out in FISA and EO 12333 adequately incorporate these concepts. However, as an unintended consequence, the provisions create a natural conflict between the law enforcement agencies of the federal government and the Intelligence Community.
What is important to understand about the effect of these regulations is the effect their implementation has had on sharing intelligence information with law enforcement and the subsequent effect on the United States' counterterrorism efforts. Each has its own purposes for acquisition of the information. In law enforcement, the aim is generally criminal prosecution, and therefore the information is collected with full intention of disclosure to the accused. In the Intelligence Community, however, which is focused on protection of national security from forces hostile to the United States, oftentimes information comes by way of sources and methods the Intelligence Community would rather not announce to the terrorist entity that are being utilized. These divergent perspectives on the purposes of information and intelligence especially clash in the realm of international terrorism, since such activity has both a criminal and a national security component. In addition to requiring court review of proposed surveillance (and later, physical searches), the 1978 Act was interpreted by the courts to require that a search be approved only if its 'primary purpose' was to obtain foreign intelligence information. In other words, the authorities of the FISA law could not be used to circumvent traditional criminal warrant requirements. The National Security Agency (NSA) also fa ced challenges with collection and dissemination of intelligence. Since FISA prohibits the agency from deliberately collecting data on U.S. persons, it took on a culture of avoiding anything domestic, even if technically and lawfully able to collect the information. xlvi Restrictions to mixing domestic information with foreign intelligence, established by EO, also contributed to the agency's inability to transfer intelligence to law enforcement. The 9/11
Commission observed that the NSA had intelligence reports about Usama bin-Laden, but because of its handling procedures, this information either did not get to the FBI or it arrived in such a manner as to be untimely or ill-understood.
xlvii In addition to many other failures within the government, the 9/11 Commission observed that the Intelligence Community suffered from both real and perceived barriers to the effective handling of intelligence information pertaining to the events leading to the terrorist attacks on September 11. This intelligence failure formed the basis of three of the five major recommendations developed in their report. These three recommendations are:
• "unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center;" • "unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director;" and,
• "unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a networkbased information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries." xlviii The essence of their findings is that, although proper rules exist in order to protect individual liberties, governmental culture and bureaucracy have grossly misrepresented those protections and created an environment devoid of a synoptic view of the battlespace (i.e. -the U.S. homeland). The 'stovepipes' hindered any one agency from seeing enough information to detect, identify, classify, and neutralize the threat. Hence, in the commission's collective judgment, some form of governmental reorganization is in order to break down the 'walls' and unify the efforts of thousands of people, all doing the right things but to a detrimental, or at least suboptimal, effect.
FEDERAL RESPONSES
Even while the 9/11 Commission was conducting its inquiry, the federal government was in the midst of significant change, both physically and philosophically, to deal with the threat of international terrorism. Congress had already passed the USA PATRIOT Act and was tackling the issue of intelligence reform. The Executive Branch had reorganized, first creating the Office of Homeland Security, and then, subsequent to Congressional legislation, the Department of Homeland Security.
The National Security Strategy characterized this reorganization as "the largest government reorganization since the Truman Administration created the National Security Council and the Department of Defense." xlix Philosophically, the Strategy for Homeland Security recognized that "Congress, with the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, took important steps toward identifying and removing some barriers to the exchange of intelligence." l More steps were to come. The following is a brief analysis of the significant activities at the federal level which impact upon the use of intelligence. The Act removed the major legal barriers that prevented law enforcement, intelligence, and national defense communities from talking and coordinating their work to protect the American people and our national security. The government's prevention efforts should not be restricted by boxes on an organizational chart. Now police officers, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, Federal prosecutors, and intelligence officials can protect our communities by "connecting the dots" to uncover terrorist plots before they are completed.
USA PATRIOT ACT
liii While the counterargument has been that, in effect, the Act significantly lessens the role of the impartial judicial branch in the system of checks and balances on national security versus civil liberties, liv the prevailing sentiment, as characterized above by the 9/11 Commission, is that the Act goes a long way to removing the unduly strict interpretations of the FISA law. These efforts did not get to the heart of the issue, as seen by the 9/11 Commission and others -that of intelligence. The need was for an entity with access to all-source intelligence, foreign and domestic, with which it could fuse, analyze, and produce a more complete terrorism intelligence picture. lvii The 9/11 Commission called for creation of a "trusted information network." lviii The existing bureaucratic, legal, and human resistance to sharing information lix was an impediment to getting the intelligence out of the community and into the hands of those assessing threats to our national security. lx The
Government Reorganization
Homeland Security Act specifically addressed the issue of the "wall" by allowing, by amendment to the FISA, the interaction between law enforcement and the FISA intelligence collectors. lxi But this action is limited in its effectiveness because, while extremely useful for a particular case, it does not contribute to the greater "trusted information network."
On 27 lxiv Through these actions, the federal government established a mechanism to break down the "wall" and fuse terrorism-related intelligence from virtually all sources.
Another significant organization al decision made by the President was the designation of a military combatant command, the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), whose mission is homeland defense and civil support. Its purpose is to deter, prevent, and defeat threats to the United States, and assist in consequence management. lxv As a joint force commander (JFC), the commander of NORTHCOM exercises command authority over forces assigned to him for either of these missions.
As with all commanders, intelligence is a crucial tool in his ability to lead his force and execute his mission. Intelligence is absolutely vital in enabling the JFC to visualize his battlespace and understand his enemy. lxvi The extant statutes and regulations limit the ability of MI organizations, in effect the only organic intelligence organizations available to the commander, from providing that vital intelligence information. NORTHCOM is almost exclusively a consumer of products, generally tailored for Administration policy-makers, from the national and DOD intelligence agencies. To the extent that NORTHCOM does not routinely need to execute tactical missions, this constraint may have minimal effect on operations. However, in the event NORTHCOM is called upon to execute a homeland defense mission concerning some form of terrorist activity, tactical level intelligence collected within the United
States by MI organizations will be critical.
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
The latest in the federal actions to confront the failings of the government to prevent the attacks on 9/11 is the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 . Attempting to unify the federal counterterrorism effort, and at the suggestion of the 9/11 Commission, Congress established a Director of National Intelligence to lead the Intelligence Community, establish and prioritize foreign intelligence requirements, and assist the Attorney General in disseminating FISArelated intelligence. lxvii As mentioned above, it also established the National Counterterrorism Center.
Strengthening the federal commitment to better information sharing, and again at the urging of the 9/11
Commission, the Act also directs the President to establish a secure Information Sharing Environment.
lxviii Quite plainly, through the above actions, the Federal Government has undertaken aggressive steps to refine an incredibly capable intelligence system in order to allow it to better serve the American people. Its focus in these actions has been on enabling the intelligence system to cross the imaginary yet very real boundary between foreign and domestic intelligence as it pertains to defending the homeland from terrorist attacks.
"CONNECTING THE DOTS"
In the words of the 9/11 Commission:
As presently configured, the national security institutions of the U. While MI activities are focused on the operational and tactical requirements of the Joint Force
Commander and his subordinates, the type and value of intelligence gathered do not adhere strictly to those categories. Hence, some gathered intelligence will have exceptional value to key decisionmakers involved in the counterterrorism effort back in the United States. The review of procedures should consider that possibility and devise an efficient process, using the envisioned 'Information Sharing Environment,' to get that perishable intelligence to the National Counterterrorism Center. The process must incorporate any decisions made about Judge Advocate General and Attorney General reviews, and should also consider, as an option, after-the-fact review in order to speed the process.
Second, the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Secretary of Homeland Defens e, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, should review the roles and missions of NORTHCOM and the extant limitations it has in intelligence operations. Consideration must be given to the nature of the command, in that it does not have assigned forces and by default any forces subsequently assigned to meet a crisis will have little or no situational awareness at the tactical level.
The commander on the ground must have available to him, even in the role of supporting another agency, as much intelligence as possible concerning the physical, cyber, and threat environments. For that reason, the commander must not be restrained from utilizing organic intelligence gathering assets if they are appropriate to the environment. The commander on the ground must have available to him clear and concise intelligence 'rules of engagement' which have been vetted by Judge Advocate and approved by the Combatant Commander.
The Intelligence staff of NORTHCOM should be integrated into the 'Information Sharing Environment' and should be a client of the NCC from the outset. This capability, in keeping with any constraints and restraints determined to be necessary in order to protect the privacy of citizens, is essential in order to rapidly integrate any forces assigned to the command to execute a homeland defense or consequence management mission. Without it, the onset of any crisis will be characterized by an ill-informed and therefore ill-defined military capability which, presumably, must be able to execute any mission on extremely short notice.
These two recommendations are paradigm-breakers in a time of broken paradigms. That is, they are not out of line with the philosophy that has been fostered by Congress and the President since 9/11. Intelligence is vital to understanding. It is vital to the United States' ability to protect its territory from hostile acts by a foreign power or an international terrorist group. What the nation discovered about itself is that, over time, the balance between national security and personal privacy became uneven. National security lost. "The existing boundaries to intelligence sharing exist for a reason, but they must not become an excuse for bureaucratic inertia…" lxxiii The challenge of overcoming Cold War thinking in the 21 st century includes the challenge of overcoming bureaucratic inertia. MI can provide tremendous capability to the national effort in countering terrorism, but it is burdened by bonds of restraint. In order for the nation to reap the benefits of its capabilities, the restraints must be loosened. 
